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1. CLUSTERS IN LITERATURE AND IN PRACTICE
Although known by various names in reality (e.g. clusters,
special districts, techno-parks, technopolis), specific areas
with strong economic, technical, or cultural assets in differ-
ent settings have been created around the world. In Korean
soil, the intent has been not only to spur national economic
growth but also to help localities compete with other areas
in the global market and within Korea. Whether clusters
have grown spontaneously or been planned intentionally by
the public sector is also of significance.
A cluster can be defined in various ways; when labeled in
narrow terms, it refers to a “geographical agglomeration of
firms with similar or highly complementary capabilities”
(Richardson 1972). A further extended definition is a spatial
“concentration of interconnected companies, specialized
suppliers, service providers, firms in related industries, asso-
ciated institutions (for example, universities, standards agen-
cies, and trade associations) in particular fields that compete
but also co-operate” (Porter 1998). 
The Diamond Model given by Porter (2000), which
explains clusters in the context of regional competitiveness,
has been reiterated and patterned with great enthusiasm in
diverse literature and in practice. In a similar vein, this paper
will discuss “clusters” as a most critical means for local or
regional development; they will encompass a broad spec-
trum embracing technology parks, industrial districts, special
districts, and other geographical agglomeration that have
been systematically planned.
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In fact, there is no shortage in literature with regard to the
manner in which clusters or clustering contribute to regional
economy. Since Porter (1990; 1998; 2000) discussed the
competitiveness and productivity of national economy, clus-
tering along with innovation system has been considered as
an important approach for regional competitiveness
(Maskelland Lorenzen 2006; Park 2004; Porter 1998). It is
also maintained that the clustering of complementary firms
improves regional competitiveness and enables the creation
of jobs as well (OECD 2002). 
Yet it is not quite clear that any nature of clustering invari-
ably brings innovation, competitiveness, and eventually eco-
nomic prosperity at the local or regional level, although
there have been some world-renown successful examples
such as Silicon Valley and Oulu. Also, clustering embraces a
number of other elements and dimensions; it usually refers
to research & development combined with relevant indus-
tries while sometimes featuring value chains composing of
firms, businesses and even government activities. Among
others, two critical factors in any cases would certainly be
geographical agglomeration and interdependence.
Certain differences ought to be identified when compar-
ing American cases and most Asian practices. Such ‘old econ-
omy’ factors as entrepreneurial talent, skilled labor, direct
university-industry interaction do not appear as clear or
indispensable in Japan and Korea as in Silicon Valley or
Route 128(Feldman and Francis 2006). Centralized planning
by national/regional government later associated with firms
and colleges have been prevailing in Asian examples:
Tsukuba, Daedeok, Hsinchu, etc. That has also been the
case with many European examples, as indicated in Finland,
Germany and Sweden.
The issue of clusters is rather familiar in Korea as well,
both in academia and practice. The Korean government has
continuously adopted initiatives in creating and extending a
number of different clusters or technology parks around the
nation. A unique justification for cluster development in this
nation has been spatial equity, particularly since late 1990s.
While Seoul attempting to seek nationwide ‘balanced devel-
opment,’ local or regional governments have competed
intensely to attract clusters mainly for economic purpose,
which itself usually carries serious political implication in
each jurisdiction. Then, they have also made a great deal of
efforts to create their own clusters within. 
The previous decade has witnessed the concerted efforts
of the local or regional governments – in terms of mobilizing
politics, local press and government, and business resources
for convincing the national government and, occasionally
the National Assembly, to attract clusters or special districts,
together with accompanying resources, into their own areas.
Does the creation of clusters actually nurture entrepre-
neurship or ignite local economic development? What would
be the best methods for creating or managing clusters? This
paper does not intend directly to answer these questions, to
supply quantifiable evidence for a theory, or to provide poli-
cy suggestions readily available. Instead, I will outline what
happened in Korea with respect to the development pattern
of clusters and a few easily observed frames. 
Following this section, the manners in which clusters or
special districts have evolved and settled around the nation
will be examined. With regard to some regional case, certain
selected individual projects are highlighted. A few large-scale
projects that are underway or waiting for launch include a
Free Economic Zone (FEZ) and the Daegu Technopolis.
2. TWO PATHS IN CLUSTER DEVELOPMENT
IN KOREA
As is the case of a city, it is of considerable importance
whether clusters have grown spontaneously or been
planned intentionally by the public sector. Korea has been
well known for its rapid economic growth since the late
1960s and technical innovation in the past decades; scholars
attribute this, at least partially, to centralized planning unbal-
anced development policies employed by the national gov-
ernment until the early 1990s. Most industrial development
based on domestic and foreign investment was intended to
take place in the southeast part of the nation. A rather
unique example is Daedeok Science Town initiated by the
national government in the early 1970s and constructed in
Daejeon, an inland regional city.
No matter what the name or the brand was, there were
rarely a period in Korea since 1970s that the government
has not paid enough attention to development of highly
concentrated agglomeration of research institutes or indus-
trial businesses in certain areas. The previous Roh adminis-
tration (Feb. 2003 – Feb. 2008) and the current Lee
Administration are not exceptions, either. How then would
cluster development in the past decade fit in the context of
cluster growth or the national development strategy when
taken in its entirety?
Among others, one can examine the pattern of clustering
from the viewpoints of initiating role. After all, it is not easy
to find clusters in Korea that have spontaneously grown on
their own, that is, purely through market mechanism. Yet
there appear to be some variation among clusters, for many
of which national government played a key role to take ini-
tiative in establishing the concepts, identifying the project
sites, and physically making it happen, while a few others
were mainly led by impatient regional governments. In this
vein, two patterns of cluster development are presented as
shown in (Table 1): centralized de-concentration and region-
alized concentration.
Perhaps one of the clearest examples of centralized de-
concentration campaign would be the national ‘balanced
development’ policy of the former President Roh’s
Participatory Government during its five-year reign. It is con-
sidered, to a great extent, as unprecedented efforts toward
spatial equity. This is important partially because more con-
servative Lee administration since 2008 has made it clear to
detour from the course adopted by the progressive Roh
administration and to usher the nation into a new territory
in national spatial policy.
The other type of clustering has been kicked off occasion-
ally by the regional governments, that is, metropolitan gov-
ernments in Korea such as Daegu and Incheon. For instance,
Daegu Technopolis project was initiated almost solely by
Daegu Metropolitan City, as discussed later on. Other
numerous nationwide small-scale special districts can also be
described in a similar vein. With limited administrative sup-
port and financial assistance from Seoul, these clusters have
had to go through both grass-root expectations and real-
world challenges.
While national government sought balanced development
with emphasis on equity, survival was the key issue for many
localities that had suffered from declining population and
economic power. For those major national projects like Inno-
cities and Enterprise Cities, which will be discussed later with
details, full legislative and financial support were provided;
that was not exactly the case with regionally-initiated projects
like Daegu Technopolis. The national government-initiated
projects were highly centralized in terms of legal and finan-
cial basis, while pursuing intentionally de-concentrate socio-
economic values throughout the nation. As shown in [Table 1],
regional efforts were not always welcomed warmly by Seoul
despite region-wide efforts and cooperation - hence, limited
momentum and financial resources.
3. CLUSTERING IN
THE DE-CONCENTRATION CONTEXT
Clustering, in rough and broad terms, can be defined as
“locating related activities close together” or, in urban plan-
ning terms, refer to land-use patterns in which related activi-
ties are located in close proximity (Online TDM
Encyclopedia 2007). In what manner have clustering
processes occurred in the national setting in Korea?
3.1 “Big picture” de-concentration: rain checks or
reality check?
“…Decentralization of power to the provinces and balanced
national development has become tasks that cannot be put off
any longer. The central and the provincial parts of the country
should be developed in a harmonious and balanced manner. The
provinces should design their own future autonomously…. I will
press ahead with the task with unusual resolve…” (President
Roh Moo-hyun at the inaugural ceremony on Feb. 25, 2003).
Those were words of the past; expressions such as decen-
tralization or balanced development were not mentioned
even once in the inaugural address by President Lee on
February 25, 2008. Yet, it is still important to overview how
the distribution process of national values and resources was
established and might change in the future.
Even before the inauguration in 2003, the Participatory
Government had clarified a shift in the entire paradigm of
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Table 1. Two paths of Korea’s cluster development during 2000s
Centralized
de-concentration
Regionalized concentration
explicit goals national balanced
development
local survival,
endogenous growth
major initiating
actors
national government regional / local government
primary values equity efficiency
institutional
support
䤎legislative support
䤎national financial sup-
port
䤎regional governments’
support
䤎region-wide cooperation
䤎grants-in-aid from national
government
Cases 䤎Enterprise cities
䤎Inno-cities
䤎(small) special districts
䤎Daegu Technopolis
䤎Daegu Gyeongbuk Free
Economy Zone
䤎region wide large-scale
projects
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national development; state priorities were to be ascribed to
provincial or less developed areas outside the Capital Region
and a mixture of economic resources were redistributed
along the line. The Special Law governing Balanced National
Development, enacted in 2003, was just one of many institu-
tional measures undertaken for “balanced development.”
A special account maintained since 2004 was a major finan-
cial source for the approach of the Roh administration. The
unique fund exclusively reserved for balanced development
was launched with an amount of ＄5.5 billion it was sched-
uled to increase 8.5% every year and has been allocated for
the purpose of balancing less developed regions (Lee 2007).
The construction of the New Administrative Capital in
Chungnam Province, one of the initial grandiose schemes,
was proposed during the presidential campaign of 2002. It
primarily suggested that 85 ministries and government agen-
cies, along with thousands of public officials and their fami-
lies, were to be relocated to the newly constructed adminis-
trative capital by the year 2030. However, the daring and
symbolic project did not survive, largely due to political bar-
riers and the ruling of the Constitutional Court in October
2004. The alternative to the unsuccessful attempt was the
“Multifunctional Administrative City” (MAC), which would
function as the second capital of the nation if completed.
The Presidential Office, National Assembly, and Supreme
Court would remain in Seoul (Lee 2007 for details).
The term of the Roh administration officially ended on
February 2008; it is difficult to wholeheartedly celebrate
when it comes to the reality of the aforementioned spatial
de-concentration efforts (Kim 2005; Lee 2005) or cluster
development, although a few cases deserve mention and
ought to be appreciated.
The New Administrative Capital project was significantly
downgraded since 2005 to building a “Multifunctional
Administrative City” in the same area, approximately one and
a half hours south of Seoul. The newly-built city, Sejong, to
be governed by a regional-level government based on a 2010
law, is expected to be home to 500,000 residents by 2050;
the ministries will relocate to the new city from 2012 to 2014
(MAC www.happycity.go.kr). Although Lee administration
has reluctantly pledged to remain on the current path, a
series of drastic government restructuring took place and,
inevitably, the total number of ministries and government
agencies, including those relocating public officials, has been
drastically reduced. That may also be the case in the reloca-
tion of public corporations to non-Capital Regions as elabo-
rated later. Discussions began for overhauling and reshuf-
fling the organizations of current public corporations, a
majority of which are scheduled to move out of Seoul area.
“Enterprise Cities” were planned in order to permit firms
to take an initiative in developing the countryside, thereby
granting considerable incentives for firms. The main intent
of building Enterprise Cities was to steer more active eco-
nomic development in combination with residential and
commercial development, thereby maximizing the vitality of
the private sector. However, it remains doubtful whether the
designation of Enterprise Cities mirrors the industrial and
economic potential of each region (Lee 2007).
This program was unprecedented because the private busi-
nesses, even world-famous Korean conglomerates, Chaebol,
had remained either targets or beneficiaries of government
regulation or leadership, not the main players in this nature of
land development. However, the relevant law entitled firms to
make the first move and have access to a clearly faster permit
process in addition to various regulatory waivers within desig-
nated areas. National and local governments even pledged to
provide financial assistance and tax relief in order to encour-
age private investment, once it was designated.
Since the enactment of the Special Act on the Development
of Enterprise Cities in 2004, six cities including Chungju,
Muan, Taean, and Wonju, have initially been selected as target
areas for the initial program of Enterprise Cities. The actual
construction began in Taean in October 2007, which was fol-
lowed by Chungju and Wonju. Even with apparently unfair
preferential treatment for conglomerates, such as Samsung
and Hyundai, in terms of development in these areas, the
mid- and long-term performance of this project is still uncer-
tain. While no clear sign of success or initial enthusiasm has
appeared or been maintained in light of the development
process or estimate on tangible achievement, certain nega-
tive signals are often exposed. The process has been very
slow; the outcome has yet to become clearer. On the other
hand, there is continuing criticism against little or no finan-
cial support from the government for this project. 
Eleven Regional Innovation Cities (Innocities) that are to
host a number of public corporations relocated from Seoul
and its vicinity are noteworthy. This nature of large scale de-
concentration project has never been attempted in the mod-
ern history of Korea. Creating an Inno-city, a ‘share out’ for
every region, was a perfect showcase of the de-concentration
campaign of the previous administration; major national pub-
lic bodies, albeit not government ministries, were scheduled
to be scattered around the nation, their numbers amounted
to 175 from among a total of 345 state-owned bodies.
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Although every metropolitan city and province was
‘distributed’ seemingly fair number of moving entities,1 the
competition within each region was nothing but tough. The
strenuous political battle to become an Inno-city within each
region was extended into another lower-level dispute among
cities or counties. The repercussion from the process does
not appear to have been fully addressed.
Overall, the Inno-city project appears to be relatively
promising. Thus far, this project has survived various politi-
cal obstacles. Since the official plan for relocating 28 agen-
cies in the first round was settled and approved in December
2007, right before the former president Roh stepped down,
137 agencies out of 147 (the latest approval being nine orga-
nizations in May 2010) have finalized and got approved their
relocation to each Innocity throughout the nation
(http://innocity.mltm.go.kr).
With that said, however, the relocation of public agencies
too faces a number of barriers, e.g., huge costs, reluctance of
the employees of the agencies who are living in Seoul area,
and, above all, opposition from the new ruling party. Despite
the advantages and disadvantages associated with this project,
it is still difficult to precisely evaluate the effectiveness of this
project. Certain new ruling group members continue to argue
that the concept of relocation is unreasonable and unrealistic.
Not surprisingly, despite its survival thus far, all the Innocities
projects around the nation have not been displaying any sign
of speedy development, particularly since the current
President Lee was sworn in in February 2008 and another one
in the general election (for National Assembly) in April 2008. 
As of January 2012, the project is well behind the sched-
ule. According to the existing plan, major public organiza-
tions and their 32,000 employees were supposed to relo-
cate from Seoul and the Capital Region by 2012, which has
yet to happen. In fact, there is no agency or organization
that has actually relocated in to any Innocities, although
the compensation for the private properties in the Inn-
cities has reached to 98.6% and selling in lots 64.4% on
average(http://innocity.mltm.go.kr).
3.2 National initiatives for cluster development
National de-concentration campaign aside, a much earlier
version of ‘cluster development’ outside the Capital Region
would be science parks or technology parks in Korea -- the
issue of which is neither new nor fully addressed in acade-
mia and practice. The continuing prototype scheme for
Korea’s science park is undoubtedly the development of the
Daedeok R&D Special District (Daedeok Innopolis) since
early 1970s at a cost of approximately ＄30 billion for the
past 35 years. The unique place, the core of which is more
popularly known as Daedeok Science Town, is located in
Daejeon, the fifth largest city of the nation next to Daegu,
and home to more than 70 prominent research institutes
and hundreds of firms.
A number of smaller versions of the science town have
been emulated since the late 1980s. For example, there are
six techno-parks in different parts of the nation that were
established with partial support of the central government
since 1997 that are worth noting.2 In administrative terms,
they are treated simply as national or local “industrial
estates,” however, they were expected to function as incuba-
tors to cultivate venture companies, conduct joint research
and development for high-tech industries, and play a signifi-
cant role as education and training centers. For example, the
Gyeongbuk Techno-park in Gyeongsan near Daegu was
established in an area of 36.8 acres at a cost of ＄67.5 million.
A mixture of entities has been involved in its establishment
and operation: two local governments (Gyeongsan City and
Gyeongbuk Province), five local universities, a local chamber
of commerce and industry, and numerous private firms. The
success of the establishment of this techno-park is uncertain,
there have been signs that a large number of techno-parks
are struggling and have not been successful in attracting
high-tech tenants. It is believed that increased efforts
and policy measures are necessary (Koo 2003; Lee 2003).
Apparently, the previous administration had attempted to
create industrial and innovative clusters as part of its
balanced development strategy. The creation of various
types of clusters or other geographical agglomerations has
been attempted recently. From an official viewpoint, each
and every city, county, and province in the entire country is
said to have been named “innovative cluster,” and the
Regional Innovation Committee, a powerful organizations
under direct control of Presidential Office during the Roh
administration, was established in order to participate in
1 The only exception outside the Capital Region was Daejeon, which was not invited in the relocation because the city of 1.5 million residents is already home to the
Third Government Complex and the Daedeok Science Town.
2 Although the two terms, techno-park and technopolis, are used interchangeably in literature, these six techno-parks are considered much smaller than a technopolis,
e.g., the Daegu Technopolis mentioned later in this paper.
important decision-making process and resource allocation
procedures. “Innovation” was a national mantra; “cluster”
became a cliché not only in the planning profession but even
in everyday conversation.
A majority of the government-funded projects entailed
tough competition among localities as well as provision of
sufficient funds by participating local authorities. The assign-
ment of funds to a variety of small and large projects did not
turn out necessarily equal because the foremost intention of
the scheme was to utilize the potential of the localities’
rather than fairly distribute resources, unlike the case of
Inno-cities. Nevertheless, the rags to riches story was borne
in mind to a large extent by the localities involved or those
that were encouraged to apply; these attempts were promot-
ed more broadly on a regional scale, e.g., at the level of
provincial government.
3.3 Small-scale special districts around the nation
On top of large-scale development and clustering projects,
there are a number of small “special districts”(SD) that must
be discussed. Basically, the key purpose of these programs
was to maximize local potential by developing, in a majority
of the cases, historical assets, natural resources, or human
factors. Understandably, all these SDs have been initiated by
the national government, i.e., through the former Ministry of
Finance and Economy and the former Ministry of
Government and Home Affairs. Upon request for proposal
by the ministries, each city or county was entitled to identify
and make suggestions on detailed project plans along with
financial needs and requirements.
SD, teuk-gu in Korean, may be called a hybrid when it
comes to their launch and operation. They have been influ-
enced largely by national campaign but pictured and carried
out by local or regional force. Since the system of special dis-
tricts was introduced in late 2004, local governments have
been encouraged to join and benefit in order to get their
industries or other features with comparative advantage pro-
moted even further. There are no direct subsidies or tax
reliefs from the national government but a number of regula-
tory exceptions may be granted. Until 2010, 410 regulatory
exceptions out of 607 available have been granted.
Additionally, in many cases, indirect financial support from the
national or regional government has been provided as well.
In the beginning stage, the majority of the SDs focused on
the development of local natural resources (e.g. medicinal
herb, grape, strawberry), the trend has shifted greatly for the
past seven years or so to high-tech industries (e.g. shipbuild-
ing, solar energy), education (e.g. foreign language, interna-
tional education), and so forth. 
As an example of centralized de-concentration campaign,
one can easily find out some distinctive features of SD devel-
opment for the past seven years. First, a majority of the clus-
tering projects, although aimed at de-concentration, have
been initiated and implemented in a centralized manner by
the national government, mostly by the Ministry of
Knowledge Economy. That said, these “special” districts may
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Table 2. Samples of special districts by region in Korea
Region Special districts (city’s or county’s name bold)
Seoul City (5) Dongdaemun Oriental Medicine SD; Nowon International Education SD; Jung-gu English Education SD
Busan City (4) Gijang Seaweed SD; Dong-gu China Town SD; Haeundae Convention/Film/Sea leisure SD
Daegu City (3) Buk-gu Glasses SD; Jung-gu Fashion Jewerly SD; Oriental Medicine SD
Incheon City (3) Ganghwa Medicinal Wormwood SD; Seo-gu Foreign Language Education SD; Jung-gu Chinatown SD
Gyeonggi
Province (10)
Goyang Flower Industry SD; Gunpo Youth Education SD; Yeoncheon Experience Peace SD; Yangpyeong Eco-friendly Agriculture SD; 
Yeoju Rice Industry SD; Icheon Ceramics SD
Gyeongbuk 
Province (24)
Gyeongsan Seedling Industry SD; Gimcheon Grape Industry SD & Plum Industry SD; Mungyeong Omija Industry SD; 
Bonghwa Pinetopia SD; Pohang Guryong Gwamegi SD; Sangju Dried Persimon SD; Seongju Melon Industry SD; 
Cheongdo Persimmon SD; Andong Ma SD; Yeongdeok Clean Energy SD, Crab SD; Uiseong Garlic Industry SD;
Yeongyang Experience Eco-village SD; Yeongju Global HR Education SD
Jeonbuk 
Province (14)
Gochang: Scenery Farming SD & Mountainberry SD; Gimje Beef Industry SD; Namwon Wellness Herb SD; 
Buan Film SD, Silkworm SD & New Recycling Energy SD; Sunchang Paste Industry SD; Wanju Women Herb Clinic SD; 
Iksan Oriental/Western Medicine SD; Jinan Red Ginseng Medicine SD
Jeonnam
Province (29)
Gangjin Foreign Language SD; Gokseong 21C Advanced Education SD; Boseong Herb Tea SD; Suncheon International Education SD; 
Yeosu Osean Resort SD, International Tourism SD & City Park Resort SD; Jangheung Oriental Medicine SD; Hanpyeong Butterfly SD
not be special any more, largely because they are present
just everywhere throughout the nation. Every inland
province has at least 10 (in Gangwon and Gyeonggi), and as
many as 29 (in Jeonnam), SDs; metropolitan cities also are
home to two (in Ulsan and Gwangju) to five (in Seoul) SDs.
As of December 2011, the number of SDs in the nation has
reached to 150 of which just a few examples are presented in
[Table 2] (MKE 2011).
[Table 3] indicates major types by which the money has
been allocated; there certainly is some variation. For
instance, medical and health field has not attracted sufficient
investment as initially planned, while such categories as edu-
cation, industries & research, and local resources have been
finance-wise so successful. It may be time for setting priori-
ties and making tough choices.
Third, a large number of these projects, similar to the case
of techno-parks, have not fully developed the endogenous
potential or vitality of the private sector of each area. Based
on ministry-initiated requests for proposals, a number of far-
too-compliant local governments made haste in developing
a plan within limited resources merely to meet the deadline.
Multiple localities, urban and countryside alike, have been
designated, and share the name of, improbable “international”
or “foreign language” education SDs in such areas as Asan,
Gangjin, Geochang and Changnyeong, most of which are
considered rural areas or farming communities. In certain
cases, one city or county has been designated multiple SDs
as partly shown in [Table 2]. It has been suggested that
overlapped designation simply hinders efficient or concen-
trated support and development by already financially-strug-
gling localities.
Last issue has something do with overall capacity and
effectiveness. It appears that numerous local governments
simply cannot afford the project in terms of the local capacity
despite having been awarded the designation of an SD. In
certain cases, no further action has been taken since the offi-
cial designation, with the exception of some procedural
measures. Apart from insufficient grants-in-aid from the
national government, it is argued that certain local govern-
ments, particularly the elementary-level counties rather than
autonomous districts in metropolitan cities, have yet to
develop – in addition to taking much more time -- their
capacity and experiences to undertake such tasks.
The effectiveness of the SDs has yet to be proved not only
in terms of expectation but also in the actual course of
action. Although it may be early to comprehensively evaluate
the programs, it is argued that a majority of the SD projects
have already been stalled or lost their momentum. This has
happened mainly due to poorly initiated plans, lack of finan-
cial resources, lukewarm contribution from the private sec-
tor, and above all, lack of the overall capacity to continue.
Criticism against the development of numerous SDs in the
past years may have been politically motivated because of the
implication of the motive of balanced development. There
appears to be simply large variation in terms of the progress
of an SD and what it has already accomplished. A systematic
and comprehensive analysis in this regard should follow.
4. REGIONALLY CONCENTRATED EFFORTS
FOR CLUSTERING
As discussed, the overall de-concentration projects appear
to have slackened or faced challenges. In all fairness,
the initial efforts of the previous administration deserve
appreciation; they have yet to prove feasible and accomplish
much more in the future. The current administration which
opposes, in principle, calculated government intervention or
continuing the de-concentration drive may in fact damage
the overall process in the future. In this context, regional
efforts for cluster development find its place.
4.1 National competition for de-concentration projects
Particularly from the beginning of the 21st century, there
have been fierce competition in Korea among
regional/local governments for attracting ‘nationally distrib-
uted’ clusters and projects; encouraged competitions often
resulted in negative backlashes in many cases. Local gov-
ernments have competed intensely for clusters to be locat-
ed in their jurisdictions. Since the direct costs of such com-
petition were most frequently exhaustive paper work and
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Table 3. Investment distribution in special districts (￦ billion, %)
(￦ billion)
2010 2004 - 2010
planned invested (%) planned invested (%)
medical, health 139 3 2.4 348 51 14.9
tourism, leisure 687 262 37.5 2,179 1,552 71.3
education 154 172 111.5 411 452 110.0
logistics 135 105 77.7 467 456 97.6
industries, research 383 290 75.8 1,643 1,638 99.7
local resources 387 454 117.4 1,267 1,509 119.1
(Total) 1,888 1,288 68.3 6,317 5,661 89.6
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pledges for requisite funds from local governments, it is
not surprising that concerted efforts to convince national
governments to create clusters or SDs have been witnessed
over the past few years. The potential incentives for the
competitions were, in a majority of the cases, grants-in-aid
and regulatory waivers from the national government and
other related resources provided along with the projects.
The seemingly fair competition has not always yielded fair
results, let alone effective ones.
Major criticism against this course of action has something
to do with the validity and consistency of the criteria on which
final decisions were made. A few years ago, large cities like
Daegu and Daejeon, both in the non-Capital Region, lost in
national competition for huge projects such as the Magnetic
Levitation Train project and Robot Land development, and
have joined in fierce condemnation against the central gov-
ernment on account of spatial inequality (Incheon, another
metropolitan city adjacent to Seoul, won both projects).
The massive government-initiated project High-tech
Medical Complex, for which relevant laws have already been
enacted and approximately ＄5.8 billion – or ￦5,600 billion
-- will be invested in the next 30 years, was another national
large-scale project. After fierce competition among 10 cities,
including major ones such as Daejeon, Incheon, and Pohang,
Daegu won the big prize; For Daegu, gaining the complex
was a rare political victory as well as an economic assurance. 
Undoubtedly, none of the national balanced development
projects planned during the Roh Administration are wel-
comed now and that most have been significantly changed
in its nature and scale by the current administration. This is
largely because the various proposals of the Lee administra-
tion on economy and spatial development are premised on
the view that market in partnership with firms is the primary
force for becoming an “advanced country” and that balanced
development excluding the Capital Region is inefficient as
wells as unfeasible. In this world, competition in market
mechanism is far more encouraged and promoted just as in
textbook; concentration, not de-concentration, is considered
economically efficient and even socially more desirable.
Accordingly, local governments are urged and even forced to
make every effort to facilitate the creation of clusters in their
jurisdictions, even without external help or initiation.
4.2 Daegu case: Technopolis and more
The way clusters of various types have been created in
Korea’s regional context, particularly over the past years, is
quite different from national one. Great attention should be
on endogenous efforts, region-wide cooperation, and
‘concentrated’ development within a region with potential in
terms of technology, education, culture, etc. Daegu, the
fourth largest metropolitan city in Korea, has not only partic-
ipated in the national competition for clusters, but also pur-
sued creating its own clusters. 
Daegu and its assets
Daegu, located inland and southeast on the Korean penin-
sula, boasts ample historic and cultural assets within and
adjacent to the city. The region has also been home to a
number of distinguished people in such fields as politics,
economy, and culture. However, recent decades have wit-
nessed the downgrade of the city from the top regional cen-
ter of Korea to a mere declining local city. Daegu is certainly
not an isolated case in the discussion of issues such as down-
town deterioration, sluggish economy, decreasing jobs, and
environmental degradation. While Korea has enjoyed a
series of assorted benefits from its world-renowned rapid
economic growth over decades, Daegu region appears to
remain one of the least benefited, or even the most steadily-
hit by the recent economic stalemate.
The city of Daegu, the birthplace of Samsung, encompass-
es an area of approximately 885km2, or 0.9% of the total land
of the nation. The number of residents is approximately 2.5
million, which is 5.3% of Korea’s total population of about 48
million. Daegu Metropolitan City is one of the seven regional
governments in Korea.
The typical regional city of Korea has had its defining
moments and appears to remain proud of its abundant
resources. Daegu is often been labeled ‘the city of scholars.’
What the citizens are still proud of is that, as an old saying
goes, approximately half of the prominent scholars and high-
level officials of the nation are said to have been from the
Youngnam -- of which the city has been the political hub for
more than 400 years, since the 17th century. Daegu has
recently hosted several international events such as a portion
of the 2002 FIFA World Cup and the entire events of the 2003
Summer Universidad and the IAAF World Championship in
Athletics in 2011 [summarized from (Lee and Park 2008)].
Efforts for clustering in Daegu
As mentioned earlier, a majority of the recent cluster devel-
opment cases in Korea have been driven by the national gov-
ernment, and it is not easy to identify practices based entirely
on local initiation. This is also partially because Korean locali-
ties have continuously benchmarked each other. Daegu,
Shi-Chul Lee, WTR1(2):129
1372012 Copyright©World Technopolis Association
which has suffered from a great deal of economic difficulties
in past decades, has also begun cluster development, thereby
attempting to create another economic base on its own while
competing for the nationwide cluster ‘war.’
To begin with, Daegu will be the new home for 12 public
agencies, including the Korea Gas Corporation, which is
scheduled to relocate from the Capital Region, as discussed
earlier. Daegu is just one of the beneficiaries of the legacy of
the nationwide balanced development campaign, although
the actual effectiveness of the repositioning work is any-
thing but certain. With the abundant human resources in
the region, e.g., approximately 50,000 annual graduates
from over 30 colleges and universities, Daegu City has taken
initiative in developing more specified knowledge-based,
and yet business- and education-oriented, projects in its
Innocity. Although Daegu is another land-hungry city in
Korea, a significant portion of land within the boundaries of
the city had been saved for the site of the Innocity, or
Palgong Innovalley, for public agencies that are relocating
from Seoul region.
The economic reality of Daegu requires something far
more than usual. For a start, its GRDP per capita is the low-
est among all metropolitan cities and provinces in the
nation. In the manufacturing industry, which accounts for
21.7% of the GRDP of Daegu, has been declining constantly
for decades. Admittedly, the leadership of the local govern-
ment in restructuring the city’s old-fashioned industry was
not as successful as intended. Textile and other labor-inten-
sive production continuing to be the major industry in
Daegu, knowledge-based industry accounts for much less
than 50% of Seoul, and is even smaller than the national
average. Daegu has attracted the lowest level of foreign
direct investment (FDI) in the nation for the past four
decades. Deteriorating industrial complexes and declining
productivity have caused sufficient trouble. Since the 1980s,
huge projects such as the construction of the Wicheon
Industrial Park and the Bongmu Apparel Complex have been
attempted, only to fail. The effectiveness of the “Milan
Project” in the 1990s to support and regenerate local textile
industries continues to be disputed (Lee and Park 2008).3
Reviewing the existing conditions for industrial clusters in
Daegu, Park et al. (2003) too suggested that the industrial
clusters have not yet been well developed in the city.
Clustering depended, understandably, on each industry; how-
ever, at the time of analysis, the levels of major components,
such as localization, embededness, and institutionalization of
industries, appeared about average, while competitiveness in
general was slightly below average, the study found. 
In addition to the specific and detailed analysis of individ-
ual industry as in Park et al. (2003), several on-going large-
scale projects can be marked: the Culture Industry Cluster,
the Daegu Technopolis, and, more recently, the Brain City
project. The first major project, a culture industry cluster,
isconsidered one of the most promising alternative policy
means for regional development. Daegu is not the only city
that is developing a culture industry cluster since the mid-
1990s; it is one of the few local cultural industrial districts
designated and supported by the national government since
early 2000’s. Yet the role of City Hall has been rather clear
and meaningful.
Emphasizing the IT resources and abundant cultural assets
of the city, the Daegu Culture Industry Development Master
Plan was developed and authorized in 2004, and a redevel-
oped college site in the city center was selected for con-
structing theme parks, traditional folk villages, and various
exhibition and convention facilities. The initial phase is
expected to be completed by 2015, with an estimated cost
of ＄1.4 billion, a similar cost for building Burj Khalifa, a
160-story 828-meter tower in Dubai, UAE. In 2008, the for-
mer college site of 120 thousand square meters in the
downtown area has been officially designated by the
Ministry of Culture and Tourism as the Culture Industry
Promotion District, together with seven other cities
(Youngnam-ilbo 2008. 2. 29).4 Significant tax benefits and
partial financial support are provided to firms and entities in
these districts.
The second is the decade-old Daegu Technopolis project.
If a technopolis is “an agglomeration of highly innovative
activities structured as a network in which the emergence of
cooperative ties among the scientific, technical, educational,
and institutional agent is expected to enhance the techno-
logical and innovative capability” (Chorda 1996 – requoted
from Koo 2003) for overall competitiveness, that is exactly
what the city government intends to achieve through the
3 The Milan Project was named after a namesake Italian sister city of Daegu, referring to the hope and efforts of the city to revitalize the century-long textile industry
of Daegu into a high-tech business and contemporary design and fashion industry.
4 The Daegu cultural industrial district is specialized in game industry and mobile contents. The other cities are Bucheon (publishing, animation), Cheonan (cultural
design), Daejeon (film, game), Gwangju (character), Jeju (digital film, mobile contents), and Jeonju (Film) (Choo 2007).
project. The site for the Daegu Technopolis, located south-
west of the city and encompassing an area of 1,800 acres, is
intended to be a future center for research, industry, educa-
tion, and housing. 
Although the initial plan was already prepared in the late
1990s, the actual construction began only in 2006 in partner-
ship with the Korea Land Corporation; it is scheduled to be
completed by 2015, at a cost of approximately ＄2 billion, or
￦ 1,900 billion. While hosting leading-edge manufacturing
industries and residential development, it would be home to
some major research institutes such as the Daegu-
Gyeongbuk Institute of Science & Technology (DGIST), an
ETRI branch, the National Science Center, and possibly the
KNU College of Engineering and the Medical School (Lee
and Park 2008). In particular, DGIST has officially been
launched in November 2010 after two year construction; the
first cohort of master and doctoral students was matriculated
in March 2011 (DGIST 2012).
This significant project has not greatly benefited thus far
from any systematic and stable support from the national
government. (one of the convenient justifications, especially
before 2008, would be that the entire region had been far
away from the political inner circle for the “10 lost years.”)
As the name DGIST suggests, the whole project is in a large
sense a momentous outcome of institutional cooperation
between Daegu Metropolitan City and Gyeongbuk Province.
How the project will turn out remains to be seen. A greater
issue will be the number of quality firms and research enti-
ties the city and the neighboring Gyeongbuk Province can
attract in the coming years.
Regional FEZ
A notable goal that the City of Daegu in partnership with
the neighboring Gyeongbuk Province is to create a success-
ful Free Economic Zone (FEZ) within the region. The estab-
lishment of an FEZ had been encouraged since 2007, mostly
by local leadership, so as to offer “optimal business environ-
ment by providing financial incentives, relaxed regulations,
and customized facilities to global companies” (DGFEZ
2012). DGFEZ covers a total area of 40km2 in 10 separate
industrial districts in Daegu and four cities (Gumi,
Gyeongsan, Yeongcheon and Pohang) of Gyeongbuk. This is
one of the latest FEZs in Korea approved in 2008. 
Although, the whole project is within national govern-
ment’s ‘Big Picture,’ DGFEZ has been administered by the
Daegu Gyeongbuk Free Economic Zone Authority, which is
a special local government organization, or local govern-
ment in operation union. The Authority is almost entirely
staffed and financed by Daegu Metropolitan City,
Gyeongbuk Province, and other four cities. In fact, it was
local community as a whole that identified the necessity
and justification of DEFEZ in the first place. Scholars, the
press, politicians, non-governmental organizations and City
Hall have reportedly shown unusual cooperation in the
process. Of course, the role and influence of Seoul, mostly
through the Ministry of Knowledge Economy, are still
sensed when it comes to major institutional changes and
financial assistance.
Although it is not as large as the FEZs in Dubai (JAFZ,
100km2), UAE, or Incheon (209km2), DGFEZ is a promising
start. That said, it has a long way to go; no meaningful FDI
has been attracted so far. The city in tandem with the part-
ner province and cities pursues the progress of knowledge-
based service and manufacturing industries simultaneously.
Again, tangible inducements, including exemption or signifi-
cant reduction of land-leasing costs, tax holidays and relief,
cash grants, support for urban infrastructure, are to be pro-
vided, in addition to regular incentives for FDI, for the firms,
businesses and educational entities within the DGFEZ.5
Overall, the current efforts of Daegu to restructure the
entire industry are centered on a few grand projects for the
provision of research and industrial space, rather than on
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Fig. 1. A blueprint for Daegu Technopolis within Daegu Gyeongbuk FEZ 
Source: DGFEZ (2012).
5 The Daegu cultural industrial district is specialized in game industry and mobile contents. The other cities are Bucheon (publishing, animation), Cheonan (cultural
design), Daejeon (film, game), Gwangju (character), Jeju (digital film, mobile contents), and Jeonju (Film) (Choo 2007).
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scores of small-scale clustering projects. As introduced, the
first promising clustering project, Daegu culture industry
cluster, is relatively central government-oriented. Daegu City
successfully attempted to gain the project and survived
fierce competition; the project has been launched, along
with administrative and financial support from both national
and local governments.
The other two schemes, the Technopolis and the DGFEZ,
can be regarded as comparatively more endogenous in that
the local government identified locally unique and abundant
assets and began focusing on development of the resources.
Yet Daegu City was not, and will not be, entirely indepen-
dent for all these projects; the city has recently expected var-
ied aid help from the national government, partially for the
reason that the current president and his inner circle mem-
bers are rooted in this region. To a large extent, it is believed
that indeed happened for recent years.
One other feature in recent times is that region-wide
cooperation has been unusually emphasized, particularly
since 2006. Daegu Metropolitan City and its parent
Gyeongbuk Province, which have occasionally focused on
competition rather than on cooperation or built an antag-
onistic relationship with each other, have lately displayed
genuine cooperation.6 Furthermore, the so-called ‘ultra
regional’ cooperation has been suggested, implying col-
laboration with the Busan and Gyeongnam region. As a
beginning, substantial measures that must be taken seri-
ously would include the expansion of region-wide infra-
structure, such as regional international airport and addi-
tional expressways.
Based on a recent agreement between Daegu City and
Gyeongbuk Province on economic integration in 2007, some
promising projects identified and agreed upon by both are
already in practice or under serious consideration, e.g., in
the nationwide competition for High-tech Medical Complex
as previously mentioned. In fact, region-wide cooperation
has particularly been underscored since the launch of the
new administration in February 2008, as indicated in a
grandiose plan to restructure the entire nation with five
large economic zones and two special large economic zones
(so called “5+2” blueprint). It is an apparently new and dif-
ferent version of the nationwide economic development
plan from the ‘national balanced development strategy’ of
the Roh administration. Daegu region also faces opportuni-
ties as well as challenges.
5. CONCLUSION
This article examined the overall pattern of cluster plan-
ning and regional development in Korea over the past
decade or so. Academic literature aside, the relevant infor-
mation and data used for this paper, drawn mostly from offi-
cial sources, appear to be reliable and could be reinforced by
further examining actual cases in other geographical set-
tings. Using a meta-analytic approach, I attempted to identify
two distinct patterns of cluster development: centralized de-
concentration and regionalized concentration. 
Apparently, the majority of notable clusters in this coun-
try have seldom grown through market mechanism.
National and local governments have taken initiative in
launching and implementing clustering campaign; regional
efforts have been made with limited success. Instead of
arguing an issue or suggesting a theory in detail, this article
focused on observing the recent experiences of the nation
and Daegu as an example in the context of cluster or
regional development.
It has now become conventional wisdom that creating
clusters is a promising method for nurturing entrepreneur-
ship, thereby turning it into an alternative policy means for
regional development. Yet, the overall process and its effec-
tiveness are not very easy or clear in Korea. Admittedly,
nationally driven efforts have usually dominated and fared
well, as was the case with Korea’s rapid economic growth in
general. However, for the past decade or so, numerous
large-scale centralized projects have stalled, been delayed or
implemented with far less enthusiasm. In this context,
regional attempts seem to have come into play with mixed
results, limited early success and on-going challenges as well,
as implied in Daegu case.
From the localities’ viewpoints in Korea, the recent devel-
opment pattern of clustering, particularly in the wider con-
text of national de-concentration, was largely worth noting
without regard to its actual success or failure. In that sense, a
number of locally-favored clustering efforts present both
advantages and great challenges that must be overcome.
6 Daegu was administratively under the jurisdiction of Gyeongbuk Province until 1981, when Daegu was promoted to a metropolitan city. The city has been separated
since then, not only administratively but also economically in a large sense, from Gyeongbuk Province.
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Centrally-designed and -implemented development may
have sufficiently displayed its limitations; local/regional
governments stand at a crossroad with regard to where they
can choose to initiate and proceed on their own paths, quite
possibly without much support from Seoul. 
For instance, Daegu, still struggling despite its great
assets, must also address similar questions: how cluster
development can be translated into actual progress; and
who should take part in clustering with what means. The
advantages of clustering in the time of knowledge-based
society do not have to be suspicious; of importance is a dis-
tinct differentiation from other similar measures for region-
al development on almost all grounds, including its gover-
nance. The real work remains unattended, with different
paths still ill-explored.
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